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This paper presents an analysis of the expression of evidentiality with the English nouns 
evidence, indication, proof and sign and their Spanish equivalents evidencia, indicación, 
prueba and señal. The nouns are described as shell nouns having the properties of 
encapsulating, signalling and labelling. The delimitation of their evidential and non-
evidential uses is determined by three factors: existence of a qualified proposition 
(Belief), non-occurrence within an irrealis context and constant value of the evidential 
qualification when the Belief refers to a plurality of events. The difficulties posed by the 
delimitation illustrate the problems involved in determining the scope of evidentiality 
when expressed by lexical devices belonging to the content of a proposition. A quantitative 
analysis was carried out on 400 occurrences of the nouns, extracted from two comparable 
corpora. The results reveal that all the nouns except two expressed evidentiality in most 
cases, that the linguistic context in which they appear shows great variation in terms 
of syntax and information structure, and that the labelling function is prominent. The 
results also uncover idiosyncratic evidential expressions with some of the nouns.
Keywords: scope of evidentiality, Noun Phrases, abstract nouns, shell nouns, encapsu-
lation, quantitative analysis
1 Introduction
The abundant literature on evidentiality that surged after pioneering references such as 
Chafe and Nichols (1986) or Willett (1988) has mostly concentrated on grammatical 
markers of evidentiality (Aikhenvald 2004, among many others) and certain types of 
words or expressions such as adverbs and lexical verbs of perception or cognition (Celle 
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2009; Hennemann 2012; Ruskan 2015; Usonienė & Šinkūnienė 2013; Wiemer & Socka 
forthcoming). By contrast, this paper explores evidential expressions containing nouns, 
which have received comparably scant attention. The contribution of this research to the 
literature on evidentiality is twofold. Firstly, it uncovers ways of expressing evidentiality 
which, in functional approaches to this category, might well be added to those most 
frequently studied to date. Secondly, a number of factors are proposed for distinguishing 
evidential and non-evidential uses of the nouns under study; these factors seem to be 
useful for the delimitation of the scope of evidentiality when expressed by different 
kinds of linguistic devices belonging to the content of a proposition.
The nouns selected for the study have an evidential meaning of “a thing or set of things 
helpful in forming a conclusion or judgment”.1 The English nouns chosen are evidence, 
indication, proof and sign, the four nouns considered in Schmid’s (2000) monograph 
on shell nouns as “[t]he four workhorses in the ‘Evidence’ family”, due to their high 
frequency in comparison with other similar nouns such as signal, implication or symptom 
in his corpus, the British section of Birmingham’s Bank of English.2 For Spanish, the 
four respective correlates evidencia, indicio, prueba and señal were selected. It might 
be argued that the nouns indicación and signo are also correlates of indication and sign, 
respectively, but their meaning is more general and they seem to display a high number of 
non-evidential cases: indicación often refers to an order to do something, and signo to a 
physical symbol, as in the case of arithmetic and punctuation signs; señal and especially 
indicio were considered to have comparably more evidential uses. The eight nouns were 
studied qualitatively for their discourse properties as shell nouns and the distinction 
between evidential and non-evidential uses, and were then analysed quantitatively 
according to these latter two uses, as well as to other syntactic and discourse properties 
of their evidential uses. The analysis was carried out on occurrences extracted from 
two comparable corpora, the British National Corpus for English and the Corpus de 
Referencia del Español Actual (CREA) for Spanish (see Section 4 below). Since the 
English and Spanish nouns have the same initials, the acronym ‘EIPS’ will be used to 
refer to the eight nouns. The expressions ‘English EIPS’ and ‘Spanish EIPS’ will refer to 
the nouns in the respective languages.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 specifies the concept and scope of 
evidentiality adopted in this paper, and the role of evidential nouns therein. Section 
3 concerns the discourse properties of EIPS as a subtype of shell nouns. Section 4 
describes the corpora and the data analysed. Section 5 deals with the distinction between 
1  This is the definition of one of the meanings of ‘evidence’ in The Free Dictionary: http://
www.thefreedictionary.com/evidence, accessed March 11, 2016.
2  Schmid’s quantitative research was restricted to the occurrences of the nouns in a num-
ber of selected patterns.
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evidential and non-evidential uses of EIPS. Sections 6 and 7 cover the quantitative 
analysis: Section 6 describes the database, and Section 7 specifies and discusses the 
results. Finally, Section 8 summarises the main conclusions and proposes suggestions 
for further research.
2 Evidentiality: concept, scope and role of evidential nouns
Considering references such as Willett (1988), Nuyts (2001, 2009), Boye & Harder 
(2009), Wiemer & Stathi (2010), Boye (2012) and Carretero & Zamorano-Mansilla 
(2013), I propose a definition of evidentiality as the linguistic expression of the kind, 
source and/or evaluation of the evidence that someone, typically but not necessarily the 
speaker/writer, has or claims to have at his/her disposal, for or against the truth of the 
proposition.3 According to this definition, the bold expressions in examples (1–3) are 
evidential expressions;4 the qualified propositions are underlined:
(1) ‘Whereas Henrietta, I see,’ Ivan continued with a remorseless pity, ‘is very much at 
home here.’
(2)  Shirley MacLaine, according to her autobiography, similarly relies on contacting 
disembodied entities through various mediums.
(3)  The schools were evidently back after Easter.
In (1), I see indicates that the evidence in favour of the truth of the underlined proposition 
is of a perceptual kind (more specifically, visual). In (2), the expression in bold indicates 
that the evidence for the truth of the proposition is of a communicative kind, and that 
its source is Shirley MacLaine’s autobiography. The inclusion of ‘evaluation’ in the 
definition of evidentiality is more controversial: some authors, such as De Haan (2005, 
380) or Wiemer & Stathi (2010, 276), state that the expressions that evaluate the evidence 
for or against the truth of the proposition should be considered as epistemic. I would say, 
however, that evaluation of the evidence should be distinguished from evaluation of 
the truth of the proposition itself: evidently in (3) indicates evaluation of the evidence 
as strong, resulting in high commitment to the truth of the proposition; by contrast, 
3  Throughout the paper, the term ‘truth’ is not used as a theoretical notion (as in truth-
conditional semantics), but as a pre-theoretical concept that people use in order to come to terms 
with the world: for example, in many contexts the utterance ‘This pullover is red’ would be con-
sidered as true even if the speaker/writer knows that it is not an absolute truth, since colour is an 
impression produced in the retina by light beams, not shared by certain animals or colour-blind 
people.
4  The examples are quoted from the corpora used for the quantitative analysis, i.e. the 
BNC for English and the CREA for Spanish, unless otherwise indicated. The original spelling 
has been maintained, including typos. The examples taken from other sources are specifically 
signalled as such.
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no doubt in its place would indicate high commitment to the truth of the proposition 
without allusion to evidence, thus being ‘epistemic’ in the strict sense. Expressions of 
the ‘evidently’ type might well be considered as ‘epistentials’, a term increasingly used 
in the literature (Simon-Vandenbergen & Aijmer 2007; Usonienė & Šinkūnienė 2013; 
Lampert 2015).
It must be noted that, for an expression to qualify as evidential, its syntactic scope 
need not be clausal: as Boye (2012, 183–184) points out, a non-clausal expression 
may communicate an implicit proposition, which can be made explicit by means of a 
paraphrase with clausal scope. For example, in (4) the syntactic scope of apparently is 
the adjective insoluble, but the implicit proposition qualified is ‘the problem is insoluble’ 
and the adverb is therefore evidential:
(4) The government is faced with an apparently insoluble problem.
Another feature of the approach to evidentiality used here is its status of functional-
conceptual domain “without interference from structural criteria associated with 
different forms of coding” (Boye & Harder 2009, 10). It is worth remembering that 
the treatment of evidentiality in early references, such as works by Franz Boas and 
Roman Jakobson in the first decades of the 20th century, and also in most of the papers 
in the seminal book edited by Chafe & Nichols (1986), was restricted to grammatical 
realisations. In a similar fashion, Anderson (1986, 274–275) considers evidentials as 
a “special grammatical phenomenon”, and proposes four criteria that evidentials need 
to meet to be considered as such: the first states that  “[e]videntials show the kind of 
justification for a factual claim which is available to the person making that claim <…>”; 
the second, that evidentials cannot be the main predication of the clause; the third, that 
evidentials must indicate evidence as their primary meaning, not only as a pragmatic 
inference; and the fourth, that evidentials should be “inflections, clitics, or other free 
syntactic elements (not compounds or derivational forms)”. Studies on evidentiality in 
this narrow sense have facilitated the understanding of its status as a semantic category 
and its different ways of expression in a wide range of languages in the world, and 
have shed light on structural facts about these languages. Here I adopt a complementary 
approach, including all the devices that mean evidentiality in the sense of the definition 
stated at the beginning of this section, in order to cast light on its scope as a functional 
domain. In accordance with this perspective, the evidential devices may be grammatical, 
lexical, semantic or pragmatic: only the first of Anderson’s criteria needs to be met for an 
expression to qualify as an evidential, with the caveat that ‘claim’ is to be understood as a 
qualification for the truth of a proposition, not as a representative speech act that consists 
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in asserting that something is true in spite of the fact that people might not believe it.5 
As shown in Boye (2010, 2012), evidential qualifications fall under the scope of speech 
acts, not the other way round: for example, patently in (5) is an evidential qualifying 
the proposition ‘the president is guilty’, and this qualification lies within the scope of a 
rogative speech act (question): 
(5) Television screens around the world seemed to show that the president and his 
associates were guilty as charged and there could be no doubt that public confidence 
in the Nixon administration had been shattered. Why, therefore, did congress not get 
on with the business of removing a patently guilty president?
Many studies on evidentiality in Western languages (see the first paragraph of the 
Introduction) have concentrated on expressions that meet Anderson’s criteria to some 
extent, such as adverbs and lexical verbs. These expressions fulfil Anderson’s second 
criterion, since they are not the main predication of the qualified clause, and often the 
third criterion, even if some of them communicate evidentiality not as a semantic meaning 
but as a Generalised Conversational Implicature, such being the case of seem, which is 
not evidential when referring to misleading appearances as in ‘John seems stronger than 
he really is’. EIPS are more peripheral devices for the expression of evidentiality: to 
start with, they are not evidentials per se, but may be part of evidential expressions or 
not, depending on the linguistic context in which they occur. For example, evidence 
in (6) is part of an evidential expression (the non-underlined part of the sentence), 
whereby the writer expresses a qualification of the truth of the proposition expressed 
by the underlined clause, based on the kind of evidence cited and with the strength 
conveyed by suggests; the degree of commitment is comparable to that of ‘it seems that’, 
the difference being that the Noun Phrase (NP) headed by evidence characterises the 
evidence with a much higher degree of precision. However, evidence is not evidential in 
any of its occurrences in (7), since it does not qualify any proposition: the fragment is an 
account of the possible ways in which evidence (treated as a commodity) can be taken in 
legal proceedings involving foreign parties. 
(6) Seismic evidence of the internal structure of the delta suggests that over thirty events 
can be identified across the region.
(7) Evidence can be freely taken by agents acting on behalf of foreign litigants; but no 
compulsory processes may be used, nor may the evidence be taken on oath. A foreign 
court is at liberty to appoint a consul in England of its own country, or any other 
5  This characterisation of the claim as a speech act is based on the entry for the noun 
‘claim’ in the Cambridge Dictionary for Spanish Learners of English, accessed September 21, 
2016: http://dictionary.cambridge.org/es/diccionario/ingles/claim
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person it desires as an examiner to take evidence. So long as the witnesses are willing 
to attend to give evidence the examination may be completed and the result returned 
to the foreign court without the intervention of the court in England.
The evidential expressions containing EIPS may be considered as peripheral, since they 
fail to comply with Anderson’s (1986) second and fourth criteria: they can be the main 
predication of the clause, as in (6) above, and do not belong to the categories specified 
in the fourth criterion. By contrast, they can be considered as complying with the third 
criterion for the reasons given at the end of Section 5. 
The choice of EIPS as the subject of study in this paper agrees with the approach to 
evidentiality proposed in this section and aims to shed light on the different resources 
that English and Spanish have for the expression of evidentiality as a functional category.
3 EIPS as shell nouns
3.1 The evidential frame
EIPS belong to the category of shell nouns (Schmid, 2000; Hunston & Francis, 2000), 
since they can all occur in the two criterial syntactic patterns indicated in Schmid 
(2000, 3):
1. Determiner + (Premodifier) + Noun + postnominal that-clause, wh-clause or 
to-infinitive;
2. Determiner + (Premodifier) + Noun + be + complementing that-clause, wh-clause 
or to-infinitive.
Schmid (2000) sets forth a classification of shell nouns that consists of two levels. The 
first divides the nouns depending on the type of experience described. Accordingly, five 
groups are distinguished: 
– The factual group, which describes facts and states of affairs;
– The mental group, which describes ideas, cognitive states and processes;
– The linguistic group, which describes utterances, linguistic acts and their products;
– The modal group, which describes possibilities, abilities, permissions, obligations, 
etc;
– The eventive group, which distinguishes activities, processes and states. 
The second level divides each group into subgroups in terms of uses rather than 
meanings. In this way, certain nouns that have developed different uses, such as point or 
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position, can be characterised as belonging to more than one subgroup. Schmid includes 
evidential nouns in the factual group, arguing that they construe experience as a fact, 
even though he acknowledges that they share semantic features with the mental group. 
I believe that evidential nouns should be classified instead in the mental group or in the 
modal group: evidential nouns such as EIPS are similar to mental nouns such as belief, 
hope or fear and to modal nouns such as possibility and certainty, and different from 
other factual nouns such as fact, problem and reason, in that they are non-factive in the 
sense of Kiparsky & Kiparsky (1970). The contrast may be seen in the construction ‘the 
+ noun + that’: the noun problem is factive since it triggers the presupposition that the 
proposition expressed by a following that-clause is true (8), while the evidential noun 
indication does not trigger the corresponding presupposition (9):
(8) Moreover, it must be said that even the patristic position in no way solves the problem 
that the symbolism of Christ is somehow male.
(9) At 3pm, he will meet Clinton and the two will be together for the next six hours, an 
indication that the president regards the Prime Minister’s visit as more than just a 
courtesy call.
Each of the subgroups is characterised by a different frame, a notion that Schmid has 
adopted from Talmy (1996) and may be defined as “a set of conceptual elements and 
relations that <…> are evoked together or co-evoke each other” (Talmy 1996, 238). The 
frame of evidential nouns consists of two components, the Sign (an observed fact) and 
the Belief (a mental state), and a relation that links them: the observation of the Sign 
triggers the Belief. For example, in (10), a paragraph about a bird,
(10) A few minutes later it emerged and flew off and then when it returned it looked at the 
wall and saw the marks and went inside. Ample proof indeed that it had recognized 
them and it realized that it was the entrance to its home.
the Sign is “[the bird] saw the marks and went inside” and the triggered Belief is “that it 
had recognised them and it realised that it was the entrance to its home”. In this paper, 
the evidential frame will be considered as such from a semantic point of view, without 
restrictions to given syntactic constructions: as will be seen below, evidential uses of 
EIPS display great variety in the syntax of both the Sign and the Belief.
In order to determine the status of the elements of a frame, Schmid (2000) adopts Lyons’s 
(1977) distinction between first-order, second-order and third-order entities. First-order 
entities are physically perceivable things, such as persons, animals, plants or inanimate 
concrete entities; they have a concrete location in space and fairly constant perceptual 
properties. The distinction between second-order and third-order entities, usually called 
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‘states of affairs’ and ‘propositions’, respectively, is more difficult to grasp. Boye (2012, 
278) states that the difference between both lies in that “states of affairs can be said to 
occur, whereas propositions can be said to have a truth value” (see also Wiemer & Stathi 
2010). Some shell nouns can take states of affairs or propositions as complements. For 
example, the complement of suggestion in (11) denotes a state of affairs, which concerns 
the bringing about of an action and has no truth value, while the complement in (12) 
denotes a proposition, i.e. a piece of information of the world that may be true or false:
(11)  The next morning, a Sunday, he agreed to Dick’s suggestion to see a West German 
doctor, had tests done the following Wednesday and was referred to Zurich for an 
operation a week later.
(12) In Jeremiah xliv.17 there is a suggestion that the moon was worshipped by the 
Israelites. 
In the evidential frame, both the Sign and the Belief normally have the status of a 
proposition. They may be realised by clauses, as in (10), but this is not necessarily the 
case. They may be a plurality of propositions: in (10), both the Sign and the Belief 
consist of two propositions, separated by the conjunction and in both cases. As was seen 
in Section 2, the propositional scope may also be implicit. For example, the Belief may 
be realised by an NP and still have the status of a proposition, as in (13),
(13)  Hyperactive children may ‘grow out of it’ in time, but this takes a long time and their 
behaviour tends to get worse before it gets better. Their inability to concentrate or 
order their thoughts means that they generally do not learn much at school, even 
though they may be quite intelligent. Some have difficulty in writing and spelling. 
There is evidence of criminality and psychotic behaviour in some hyper-kinetics 
when they reach adulthood, so it is advisable to try to sort out the problem sooner 
rather than later. 
where the Belief, expressed by the underlined stretch, is paraphraseable by the clause 
“that some hyper-kinetics develop criminality and psychotic behaviour when they reach 
adulthood”, which makes the propositional status clear.
Possible exceptions where the Sign is not a proposition are cases such as (14), an example 
cited from Schmid (2000, 111) which he considers to be no exception, arguing that “Gary 
Clark”, is at first sight a first-order entity (a male person), but the Sign is really the fact 
that he “exists and behaves in a certain way”:
(14)  Like the Postcard posse and Lloyd cole before him, Gary Clark is proof that the 
Great British Songwriting Tradition is alive and particularly well North Of the 
Border.
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These uses of first-order entities as the Sign are clear cases of metonymy. In (14), the 
whole person ‘Gary Clark’ stands for some facts connected with his life, such as ‘Gary 
Clark is Scottish’ or ‘Gary Clark wrote high quality songs’ but not others such as, say, 
‘Gary Clark is bald’ or ‘Gary Clark has blue eyes’. As for the Belief, it is rarely realised 
by a first-order entity, an exception being the two cases found of the Spanish construction 
‘poner en evidencia a’ (literally ‘put in evidence’) with an NP referring to a person. This 
construction has a pejorative meaning, with the sense of ‘make it evident that someone’s 
value or skill to do something is limited or unsatisfactory’, as in (15),
(15)    ¿Conoces   algún  lenguaje  de  programación? 
know.2sg.prs  some.m.sg language.sg of programming.n.sg
¿C, ADA, Pascal?  -siguió  preguntando- pues
C, Ada, Pascal continue.3sg.pst ask.gerund well.adv
la  verdad  es  que no tengo
the.f.sg truth.sg be.3sg.prs that no have.1sg.prs 
ni idea de lo que  hablas
no idea.sg of what.rel.nom speak.2sg.prs
-admití  casi  avergonzado  de que
admit.1sg.pst almost  embarrassed.1.sg of that
un niño  de  11  años   me
a.m.sg boy.m.sg of 11 year.m.pl I.obj.1sg
pusiera   en  evidencia.
put.3sg.pst.subj in evidence.sg 
‘Do you know any programming language? ¿C, ADA, Pascal? – he went on 
asking. – Well, the truth is that I have no idea of what you are talking about – I 
acknowledged, almost embarrassed that an eleven-year-old boy should put me in 
evidence.’
where the Belief, me, also has a metonymic value, standing for ‘that I did not know those 
programming languages even by name’, ‘that my computer skills are weak, etc.6
6  An anonymous referee considered that this construction is not evidential, since it is an 
idiomatic set phrase meaning ‘make somebody look ridiculous/put somebody to shame’. Even 
though these paraphrases are valid, I believe that the idiom can be considered as evidential, since 
the noun evidencia has not lost its meaning, and the construction communicates an evidential 
qualification in the sense that the speaker/writer evaluates the evidence as conclusive for consid-
ering that the proposition is true. In (15), the speaker acknowledges that the evidence provided 
(his response to the boy) showed that his computer skills were weak. The construction poner en 
evidencia also occurs with non-human Beliefs; in these cases there is no pejorative meaning, but 
the evidential qualification is the same. 
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As a last observation about the evidential frame, there is a difference between the 
constructions with EIPS in the two criterial patterns specified at the beginning of this 
subsection: the that-clause expresses the Belief in the construction ‘Noun + that-clause’ 
(16), and the Sign in the construction with ‘Noun + BE + that-clause’, as in (17), where 
the Belief appears before the clause in which prueba occurs:
(16) There is convincing evidence that a predisposition to alcoholism itself has a 
significant genetic component 
(17)   Yo  creo  que  este  congreso  no 
I.nom.sg believe.1sg.prs that this.m.sg congress.sg not
lo  ganó  un  sector frente
it.acc.sg win.3sg.pst a.m.sg sector.sg opposite
a  otro.  La  prueba  es   que
to other.m.sg the.f.sg proof.sg be.3sg.prs that
la nueva  ejecutiva    fue
the.f.sg new.adj.f.sg executive.noun.f.sg be.3sg.pst
elegida  por  unanimidad.
choose.ptcp.f.sg by unanimity.sg
‘I believe that this conference was not won by any sector over another. The proof 
is that the new executive committee was unanimously chosen.’
3.2 A semantic and discourse characterisation of EIPS as shell nouns
Schmid (2000) signals three major functions common to all shell nouns: encapsulating, 
signalling and labelling. The difference between the first and the second function lies 
in that ‘encapsulating’ takes an inward perspective and ‘signalling’ takes an outward 
perspective. In other words, the encapsulating function concerns EIPS’ containment of 
longer chunks of information, thus “act[ing] as host and shelter for things that would 
otherwise easily be dispersed or damaged” (Schmid 2000, 13);7 the ‘shell’ metaphor 
is most prominent in this function. Encapsulation gives rise to hypostatisation and 
reification, since the encapsulated information is conferred the status of an entity (see 
Conte 1996; Schmid 1997; Schmid 2000, 363–369). Schmid states that the nature of the 
resulting entities is illusory: in spite of the inherent stability provoked by conceptualisation 
7  As Conte (1996) and Schmid (1997) have pointed out, the relation between the encap-
sulator and the encapsulated information is not always straightforward, since the encapsulated 
information is not always clearly delimited. I will not go more deeply into this issue here for 
reasons of space. 
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as an NP, the coded concepts are temporary and ephemeral. I agree that the entity so 
created is not as cognitively salient as a concrete entity such as a dog, a table or a cake; 
however, temporariness varies with the context: for instance, investigation in science or 
journalism involves the consideration of evidence as a solid entity. In the case of EIPS, 
the encapsulated information is the Sign. For example, evidence in (18) stands for the 
Sign expressed by the stretch from ‘Dr Estelle Ramey’ until the end of the paragraph. 
(18) Stress, as everyone knows, is a real passion-killer in both women and men. As one 
friend complained: ‘One doesnʼt just suffer from oneʼs own stress - as soon as 
our manʼs job is going badly weʼre the ones who get the backlash and that always 
seems to include no sex’. Now evidence shows that it’s more than the fact that 
he has something on his mind to distract him from sex – itʼs an actual physical 
phenomenon. Dr Estelle Ramey, professor emeritus of physiology at Georgetown 
University School of Medicine, USA, explains that ‘your system is so delicately 
balanced that itʼs very difficult for your body to make two types of hormones at once. 
So decisions are made in a bio-chemical fashion as to which is more immediately 
necessary. When the brain starts signalling production of stress hormones it begins 
to inhibit sex hormone secretions.’
The signalling function concerns the role of shell nouns in information structure as 
indicators that have to be processed anaphorically or cataphorically as substitutes for 
the information that they contain. The encapsulating and signalling functions are jointly 
captured in Conte’s (1996, 1) definition of encapsulation as a cohesive device whereby 
an NP functions as a paraphrase for a portion of a text. Conte’s paper is restricted to 
anaphoric encapsulation, where the NP stands for a preceding stretch of discourse, and 
she states accordingly that the paraphrase is resumptive; on the other hand, in cataphoric 
encapsulation the NP stands for a following stretch of discourse, the paraphrase being 
therefore prospective, as in (18) above. Due to their encapsulating and signalling 
functions, shell nouns provide an economical means for processing large chunks of 
information and thus offer advantages for discourse organisation in comparison to the 
stretches of discourse that they replace. Schmid (2000, 377) even suggests that shell 
nouns reduce the amount of information held in an active state by discourse participants, 
thereby relieving the load on the short-term memory buffer. 
The labelling function assigns the lexical meanings of shell nouns to the encapsulated 
information (cf. Conte 1996, 6). Thus shell nouns can manipulate the discourse, since the 
encapsulated information is given the status of an entity characterised by their meaning. 
In the case of EIPS and the other evidential shell nouns, the encapsulated information 
(the Sign) is labelled as evidence for (or against) the truth of the Belief.  
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Schmid (2000, Chapters 14–17) deals with variations of the relative weight of each of 
the three functions depending on the construction where shell nouns appear. For reasons 
of space, I will not give an extensive outline of the discussion. Suffice it to mention two 
observations relevant to our purposes. The first is that the occurrence of the nouns in 
definite NPs as anaphoric encapsulators is mainly motivated by the linking function, 
i.e. by the need to give coherence to the discourse, as in (19), where the anaphoric 
encapsulation of the Sign (the information given in the stretch from ‘the fact that…’ until 
‘the headmaster’s window’) by the NP ‘this evidence’ facilitates information processing 
as well as information structuring in subsequent discourse: 
(19) Their assumption that ‘he knows what he has done wrong’ is based on the fact that 
Rover is slinking along the floor with its head and tail down looking for all the 
world like a naughty school boy who’s just broken the headmaster’s window. On 
the basis of this evidence they proceed to chastise Rover to a degree consistent with 
their temperament.
The second observation is that anaphoric encapsulation in the construction ‘Sign + be + 
shell noun (phrase) (th-be-N)’ places the noun after the copula, which is a communicatively 
prominent position, with the consequence that its meaning, and therefore the labelling 
function, is most prominent, as in (20):
(20) And Graham acknowledged: ‘He accepted what was said, and got on with the job. 
That is the sign of a good professional.’
4 The data
The quantitative analysis was carried out on 50 authentic occurrences of each noun, 
totalling 400 examples. In all the cases selected the noun form was singular; plural 
forms (indications, proofs, etc.) were excluded. The 200 examples of English EIPS 
were retrieved from the British National Corpus (BNC), which contains approximately 
100 million words, 90 per cent of which are written language and 10 per cent spoken 
language. Most of the texts were produced from 1975 onwards. The examples were 
randomised without a distinction between spoken and written language, by means of the 
option ‘download random set’ in the Sara-32 software, which selects a randomised set 
of examples of any size.
The 200 examples of Spanish EIPS (again, 50 of each noun) were obtained from the 
Peninsular Spanish part of the Corpus de Referencia del Español Actual (CREA), which 
consists of texts produced between 1975 and 2004, totalling approximately 85 million 
words. This part of the CREA resembles the BNC in that the distribution is also 90 per 
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cent written language and 10 per cent spoken language; therefore, the written and the 
spoken parts contain approximately 76.5 and 8.5 million words, respectively. In searches 
of words and expressions, the total number of cases is divided into pantallas (‘screens’) 
of 25 examples. Since the CREA does not have a randomisation facility such as Sara-32, 
randomisation was achieved by selecting a similar number of examples from each screen 
until a total of 50 was reached. A sample search is provided in Figure 1, which shows 
that the total number of cases of indicio is 484, divided into 20 screens. I selected three 
examples of the screens with odd numbers and two of those with even numbers, thus 
totalling 50 examples.
Figure 1. Screenshot of the search of the cases of indicio in the Peninsular Spanish part 
of the CREA
5 Evidential and non-evidential uses of EIPS
As was stated in Section 2, EIPS have evidential and non-evidential uses. To start with, 
some of the nouns are polysemous and have non-evidential meanings. This is the case 
of sign and its Spanish correlate señal in the meaning defined by The Free Dictionary 
as “a posted notice bearing a designation, direction, or command: an EXIT sign above a 
door; a traffic sign” (original italics).8 Several cases were found where señal referred to 
an instruction to do something; these cases belong to Schmid’s (2000, 170–173) frame 
8  http://www.thefreedictionary.com/sign, accessed March 26, 2016. 
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of ‘order’ within the linguistic group and are therefore non-evidential. In its turn, prueba 
also has the non-evidential meaning ‘test, trial, exam’.
The evidential uses are those included in the definition of evidentiality provided in 
Section 2. That is, EIPS are part of evidential expressions when they assess the Sign 
as evidence for or against the truth of the Belief. This is the case of (21), where the 
NP headed by proof assesses the Sign (in round font) as evidence for the Belief (the 
proposition expressed by the underlined stretch):
(21) passenger transport executives provided public proof of their interest (and subsidy) 
of metropolitan rail services by applying their own liveries. 
Two objections may be made about the consideration of these cases of EIPS as realisations 
of evidentiality, but both will be rejected. The first is that EIPS always belong to the 
propositional content of the clauses in which they occur. In (21), the truth conditions of 
the whole sentence are different from the truth conditions of the Belief (“that they were 
interested (and were subsidising) metropolitan rail services”). However, this fact does 
not invalidate their evidential status. As stated in Boye (2012, 197–198), a necessary 
condition for an expression to be evidential is to have a propositional scope, but this 
does not mean that the evidential itself, to be considered as such, cannot be part of a 
proposition. He illustrates his point with the example “It is evident that Bob is ready”, 
where evident belongs to the proposition expressed by the whole sentence, different 
from the proposition under its scope (“Bob is ready”). However, it must be noted, as 
will be seen below in this section, that this fact is a motivating reason why EIPS are 
not evidential per se, but indeed may be part of evidential expressions, in contrast to 
expressions such as evidently or allegedly, which need not be part of any proposition and 
are therefore evidential in most cases. 
The second (and related) objection, connected with Schmid’s (2000) inclusion of 
evidential nouns within the factual group, is that EIPS code the relation between the 
Sign and the Belief as a fact of the world. However, this factual status does not prevent 
the relation from expressing an evidential qualification of the truth of the proposition; 
rather, it is a necessary condition for evidential uses of EIPS.9 For example, proof in (21) 
above is encoded as a fact and expresses the evidential qualification that the Sign is a 
proof for the truth of the Belief. 
9  As will be seen later in this section, EIPS within the scope of irrealis are not coded as 
facts with the consequence that they are not evidential.
43
This demonstration of the existence of evidential cases of EIPS is to be followed by 
a delimitation of criteria for distinguishing evidential from non-evidential cases. The 
examination of the occurrences chosen for the quantitative analysis has uncovered two 
essential criteria for considering each of them as evidential: 1) the Belief exists, and 
2) the evidential qualification is constant. These criteria will be discussed in the remainder 
of this section. 
The criterion of existence of the Belief supports the consideration as non-evidential for 
the cases of evidence in (7), since the evidence is treated as a commodity not geared to 
any particular Belief. By contrast, the Belief ultimately exists in the following types of 
cases, which have been consequently considered as evidential:  
A) When the Sign is not explicit. For example, in (22) the existential construction 
evaluates the truth of the Belief by indicating that it is supported by evidence, without 
further specification. 
(22) Timing control. This allows the designer to plan the way in which the user will 
interact with the program in real time. There is evidence of the importance of 
timing in stimulating pupil learning. The micro will allow this both to be used and 
further explored.
B) When the Sign is non-existent. In these cases, EIPS communicate an evidential 
qualification by evaluating the evidence for the truth of the Belief as non-existent 
(23): 
(23) Now it is not so easy to voice those arguments. When John Major complained of 
the relentless diet of violence on our screens he tapped into a real public concern. 
That is why Alan Yentob, controller of BBC1, felt duty bound to reply, publicly 
apologising for an episode of Casualty which featured a riot. But Yentob pursued 
an ethical balancing act, still arguing there was no proof of a causal link. This 
father of a three-year-old also said parents should control what their children 
watched – as he did.
C) When the evidential relation between the Sign and the Belief is not clearly 
signalled by syntax. The relation between the two components of the evidential frame 
is to be understood in a broad semantic sense, not in a narrow syntactic or semantic 
sense. For example, the that-clause in (24) is an apposition of presumption and not of 
evidence. However, the proposition expressed by this clause, together with the initial 
clause, semantically counts as the Belief of evidence, considering that the expression 
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‘to support the presumption’ has been introduced basically to lay emphasis on the 
non-factual status of the Belief. Therefore, (24) has been counted as an evidential 
case of evidence.  
(24) The attitudes set in late Victorian times can be traced in British industry right 
through into our period. Perhaps most striking, has been their persistence even in 
the new science-based industries of the twentieth century <…>. It is not possible, 
of course, to be certain of the extent of their deleterious effect without a great deal 
more investigation. But there is already much evidence to support the presumption 
that the effect was pervasive. The contrasts which can be drawn with foreign 
industry even with such a tradition-bound country as France – are often stark. The 
widening of educational opportunity in the immediate post-war period was not 
accompanied by radical changes in its content. 
D) When the Belief is completely or almost completely implicit. In the occurrence 
of proof signalled in bold in (25), the speaker (PS28R) does not specify the Belief; 
however, its retrieval by the addressee (PS28P) from the situational context is made 
obvious in the next turn, where s/he uses the same noun proof and makes the Belief 
explicit: 
(25)  <PS28P>: But they would have only given you a book for 
 <PS28R>: Right. 
 <PS28P>: that long, if you had a valid doctor’s note for that time, surely?
 <PS28R>: No, no. You have to get another one, you see. It doesn’t work like that.I 
mean thatʼs some proof,  <…>  I mean  <…>  I  <…>  
 <PS28P>: Itʼs proof that someoneʼs issued a book to you, yeah. Iʼm not quite, has, 
is  th  it giuves no indication of why itʼs been issued, that’s the catch.
E) When the evidential qualification is not presented as stemming from the speaker/
writer at the moment of performing the utterance. For example, proof in (26) is 
within the scope of indirect reported speech. These cases could be considered as 
‘descriptive’ in the sense of Nuyts (2001, 2009). However, the distinction between 
these ‘descriptive’ cases and the others (which Nuyts names ‘performative’) is not 
always clear: in (26), the word proof may have been introduced by the reporter or it 
may lead to interpret that the reporter shares the respondents’ consideration of the 
exercise as proof for the truth of the proposition expressed by the underlined stretch. 
This difficulty to delimit both kinds of cases is also illustrated by (27), where the 
speaker uses proof as part of an evidential qualification given in the past but valid at 
the speech moment. 
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(26) Several respondents commented that both foster parents and children had 
enjoyed participating in an exercise which provided them with concrete proof of 
achievements and which sought to monitor progress systematically. 
(27) ‘You are not, as you believe, the offspring of Will Halidon–but of my late husband 
John Mowbray, fourth Duke of Norfolk.’
 Joanʼs face paled and she gazed wide-eyed at the duchess, as if suspecting that lady 
had taken leave of her senses.
 ‘Nay, it cannot be,’ she breathed.
 ‘Bess Halidon, your mother, gave me proof of it when she came here on the day 
prior to her death and asked that you be found employment.
By contrast, the criterion of existence of the Belief rules out cases in which EIPS lie 
within the scope of irrealis, and are therefore not facts like in other cases. This is the 
case of (28), where indication concerns a Sign that was expected but was not finally 
produced, and consequently the proposition expressed by the underlined stretch is not a 
Belief triggered from it: 
(28) He chose as the topic for his 30 minute address ‘The Revival of British Manufacturing 
Industry’. From the title, some might have expected Lilley to give an indication of 
his hopes for revival in the near future. But instead he spoke almost solely about the 
revival in the Eighties.10
The other criterion, constant evaluation, applies to cases where the Belief contains 
reference to a plurality of entities, so that the Belief is a proposition with an open 
variable. For example, in (29), 
(29) I take the point Chairman, and, and suggest by the criticism we will try and get 
more explicit detail in the future. <…>  In salaries or joint finance funding, so 
where there are differences it is almost entirely down to those two factors. It does 
give members an indication of the level of expenditure on particular services. 
the NP particular services causes the Belief to be an open variable, paraphraseable as 
‘of which the level of expenditure on particular services is’ or, alternatively, ‘that for 
service X the level of expenditure is XX’, ‘for service Y the level of expenditure is 
YY’, and so on. The beginning of the NP ‘an indication’, together with the preceding 
part of the sentence (which has emphatic affirmation) qualifies the Sign (‘it’, which 
probably refers to a report carried out by the speaker and others) as valid evidence, 
10  This exclusion is associated with the tendency for evidentials to occur in realis clauses 
rather than irrealis clauses and presuppositions, attested by Anderson (1986, 277). 
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without differentiating between the reliability of indications for each particular service, 
so that this use of indication is considered as evidential.
In other cases, however, EIPS do not provide a constant qualification for all the 
propositions included in the Belief, as in (30), where ‘the indirect evidence’ does not 
provide a constant qualification for all the paintings: the indirect evidence of critical 
approval may be strong for painting A, weak for painting B, intermediate for painting C, 
and so on. Consequently, evidence is not evidential:
(30) Long catalogue entries recall the cynical remark that the price of a painting is in 
ratio to the length of the bibliography in the sale catalogue. 
 Besides seeking to establish the authenticity of works in the sale room, auctioneers 
are also concerned that the title to ownership is secure. The indirect evidence 
of critical approval by a succession of owners may be interesting to a reader, 
though admittedly this demands some special knowledge about the standing of the 
collectors concerned.
The previous paragraphs of this section lead to infer that the distinction between 
evidential and non-evidential uses of EIPS is complex, which is in all probability due 
to their peripheral status within the domain of evidentiality, in the sense that the nouns 
always belong to the contents of a proposition and lie outside Anderson’s (1986) second 
and fourth criteria for being evidential. It may well be argued that evidential uses of 
EIPS fulfil Anderson’s third criterion: the evidential qualification is triggered by the 
meanings of the individual words and their combination in the linguistic context, not by 
conversational implicature, and it is non-defeasible, thereby belonging to semantics, not 
to pragmatics.
6 The database
The 400 occurrences of EIPS selected for the quantitative analysis were registered in 
a database, created with the Excel program to find the number of cases in which each 
noun is part of an evidential expression, as well as the frequency of different syntactic 
configurations of the evidential frame, common collocations, and the role of the nouns 
in information structure. The fields of the database are as follows: 
a)  The actual example.
b)  The evidential or non-evidential status of the example, according to the criteria in 
Section 5. The remaining fields were analysed only for those cases with evidential 
status. 
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c)  Clue. This field registers whether there is a clue that nuances the value of 
the evidence by strengthening or weakening it. The clue consists mostly of 
constituents of the NP headed by EIPS, such as adjectives (clear, plentiful, sure, 
untrustworthy…) and determiners (some, little, no…). Other expressions have also 
been found, such as the adverb indeed in (31): 
(31)  But even in the 1950s and ’60s the unemployment figures may not have reflected the 
‘true’ number unemployed because of people’s failure to register. In particular this 
applied to women, and one indication of it is indeed the change over the post-war 
period in economic activity rates among women.
d) Sign. This field indicates whether the Sign is explicit or not. In the former case, 
its syntactic role is registered if it is in the same clause as the evidential noun; 
otherwise, the field only registers whether the Sign occurs before or after the 
clause of the evidential noun.
e) Belief. This field indicates the syntactic function of the Belief when it is in the 
same clause as the evidential noun. When the Belief is realised in a different 
clause, this field registers whether it occurs before or after the clause of the 
shell noun. In the case of postmodifiers of the NPs headed by EIPS, a categorial 
distinction was made between Prepositional Phrases and clauses, taking into 
account a syntactic difference between the two languages: in English, appositive 
clauses are realised by that-clauses after the noun, as in ‘the proof that David is 
innocent…’; in Spanish, however, appositive clauses have to be preceded by the 
preposition de, as in ‘la prueba de que David es inocente’, literally ‘the proof of 
that David is innocent’. To make the results of the two languages comparable, 
the patterns mentioned above were both counted as appositive clauses, and the 
syntactic difference brought about by the Spanish preposition was not considered.
f) NP of the shell noun. This field registers the syntactic function of the NP 
containing EIPS within the immediate superior hierarchical unit. The following 
kinds of clausal constituents have been distinguished: Subject; Notional Subject 
(in existential constructions, as in ‘There is evidence that…’); Direct Object; 
Subject Complement (‘X is evidence that…’); Object Complement (‘I consider X 
as evidence that…’); Prepositional Complement, i.e. non-attributive complements 
governed by the verb and headed by a preposition (‘X relied on the evidence…’); 
Adjunct (optional clausal constituent); when the NP is not a clausal constituent, it 
may be a postmodifier of another constituent (‘conscious of the evidence that…’) 
or an apposition after the clause (‘I saw X, an indication of…’).
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g) Thematicity. This field specifies whether the NP containing EIPS belongs to the 
Theme or the Rheme of the clause in which it occurs. Theme, the point of departure 
of the clause, is realised by first position, and Rheme is the rest of the clause. The 
approach followed is that of Lavid et al. (2010), according to which the Theme can 
comprise either one syntactic constituent, for example a Subject (labelled Thematic 
Head), or more than one element, as when a clause starts with an Adjunct (Pre-
Head) followed by the Subject (Thematic Head).11 The rest of the constituents make 
up the Rheme. The field registers whether the NP containing EIPS is (part of the) 
Pre-Head, Thematic Head or Rheme, no matter whether it is an immediate clausal 
constituent or not. The appositive cases are considered part of the Rheme, since 
they appear at the end of sentences. In the literature on information structure, there 
is almost unanimous agreement (Firbas 1992; Halliday & Matthiessen 2014; Lavid 
et al. 2010) that in English and Spanish the more important information tends to 
occur in late parts of the clause, so by and large, the Rheme may be considered as 
having more communicative weight than the Theme.
7 Overall findings: results and discussion
To start with, the data selected for both languages display more instances of evidential 
than of non-evidential uses, the crosslinguistic difference being small (see Table 1). 
The distribution was more uniform for the English nouns: for all of them the evidential 
examples totalled from 30 to 36 (between 60 and 72% of the cases), while the Spanish 
Non-evidential Evidential Evidential + clue
No. % No. % No. % of evid. cases
Evidence 20 40.0 30 60.0 28 93.33
Indication 18 36.0 32 64.0 22 68.75
Proof 17 34.0 33 66.0 26 78.79
Sign 14 28.0 36 72.0 32 88.89
English EIPS 69 34.5 131 65.5 108 82.44
Evidencia 7 14.0 43 86.0 29 67.44
Indicio 6 12.0 44 88.0 29 65.91
Prueba 37 74.0 13 26.0 8 30.77
Señal 30 60.0 20 40.0 2 5.00
Spanish EIPS 80 40.0 120 60.0 68 56.67
Table 1. Total of evidential and non-evidential cases of the EIPS analysed, and of 
evidential cases with a clue
11  Other possible constituents of the Theme are the Interpersonal Theme and the Textual 
Theme, but no examples were found of EIPS being part of them. 
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data showed a higher frequency for evidencia and indicio and a lower frequency for 
prueba and señal, the only nouns that display more non-evidential than evidential 
occurrences. Within the evidential occurrences of EIPS, the cases with a clue nuancing 
the evidential meaning were also counted, and the percentages calculated in relation 
to the total number of evidential cases. The clue is common in both languages, which 
indicates that language users are careful to nuance the degree to which the evidence 
supports the truth of the proposition. Clues are clearly more frequent in the English data. 
The most often nuanced nouns are evidence and sign, while the least often nuanced noun 
is by far señal, followed by prueba. 
The realisations of the Sign in the English and Spanish EIPS are specified in Tables 
2 and 3. Their distribution is quite similar in the data of the two languages, although 
a number of differences are easily noticed. Firstly, the English determiner no is quite 
frequent, while its Spanish equivalent ningún (counting its inflections for feminine and 
plural) is much rarer, and limited to indicio: lack of evidence is expressed in other ways, 
such as negation of the main clause. Secondly, the Spanish data display more cases of 
the Sign fulfilling the functions of Subject and Adjunct in the clause where the evidential 
noun appears; and thirdly, the English data show more cases with the Sign in a clause 
following the clause of the evidential noun. 
Total 
English
Evidence Indication Proof Sign
Before clause 23 7 6 6 4
After clause 15 6 4 4 1
Determiner no 27 5 6 5 11
Pronoun/Determiner + 
before clause
6 0 0 0 6
Premodifier 2 1 0 0 1
Postmodifier 2 0 1 1 0
Subject 27 1 9 9 8
Direct Object 1 0 1 0 0
Subject Complement 6 0 3 2 1
Adjunct 1 0 0 1 0
Others 1 0 0 0 1
No realisation 20 10 2 5 3




Evidencia Indicio Prueba Señal
Before clause 22 6 12 0 5
After clause 7 2 3 0 2
Determiner ningún/ 
ninguna
2 0 2 0 0
Pronoun/Determiner + 
before clause
2 2 0 0 0
Premodifier 0 0 0 0 0
Postmodifier 4 3 0 1 0
Subject 37 14 11 6 6
Direct Object 0 0 0 0 0
Subject Complement 7 0 4 3 0
Adjunct 7 5 2 0 0
Others 10 2 1 1 6
No realisation 21 9 9 2 1
Table 3. Realisations of the Sign with the Spanish EIPS
Some differences in individual nouns must also be noted. The high number of ‘others’ 
for señal is due to the construction en señal de or como señal de ‘as a sign of’, where the 
Sign comprises more than one constituent. For example, in (32) the Sign comprises the 
stretch from the beginning of the clause up to ‘como’, thus consisting of more than one 
constituent, and the Belief is expressed by the NP following of: 
(32)    quinientos  jueces  colombianos  anunciaban  una 
five hundred judge.m.pl Colombian.m.pl announce.3sg.pst.ind a.f.sg
renuncia  colectiva  como  señal  de 
resignation.sg collective.f.sg as.prp sign.sg of
protesta contra  la  abolición  del 
protest.n.sg against the.f.sg abolition.sg of-the.m.sg
“jurado  de  conciencia”,
jury.m.sg of conscience.sg
‘Five hundred Colombian judges announced a collective resignation as a sign of 
protest against the abolition of the jury of conscience.’
Some peculiarities of the Sign occurring with individual nouns are the high frequency 
of the determiner no with sign, and also the relatively high frequency of evidencia and 
indicio as heads of NP Subjects: 10 of the 14 cases of Signs-Subjects with evidencia 
occurred in the construction poner/dejar en evidencia (‘put/leave in evidence’), where the 
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Belief is expressed by the Direct Object. No cases were found of the English equivalent 
construction put in evidence, although it is grammatically correct. With indicio, all the 
cases of Signs-Subjects occur in a copular construction where the noun is the head of 
the Subject Complement and is postmodified by a Prepositional Phrase with de that 
introduces the Belief, as in (33):    
(33)    La  intervención   marroquí  en  Zaire
The.f.sg intervention.sg Moroccan.sg in Zaire
-señala Alemán-  es  un  indicio  de 
Signal.3sg.prs.ind Alemán be.3sg.prs.ind a.m.sg indication.sg of
este  papel  que  comienza  a  jugar  Marruecos.
this.m role.sg that start.3sg.prs.ind to play.inf Morocco
‘The Moroccan intervention in Zaire – Alemán points out – is an indication of this 
role that Morocco is starting to play.’ 
The Belief also displays a wide variety of realisations in both languages, as illustrated 
in Tables 4 and 5. It occurs most frequently as a postmodifier with the preposition of 
Total 
English
Evidence Indication Proof Sign
Postmodifier with of + NP 76 9 22 16 29
Postmodifier with other 
prepositions
3 1 1 1 0
Postmodifying appositive 
clause
27 6 9 7 5
Postmodifying relative clause 0 0 0 0 0
Premodifier 2 1 0 1 0
Determiner 0 0 0 0 0
Subject 3 3 0 0 0
Direct Object 2 2 0 0 0
Subject Complement 2 0 0 1 1
Before clause 14 7 0 6 1
After clause 0 0 0 0 0
Implicit in the context 2 1 0 1 0
Table 4. Realisations of the Belief with the English EIPS
in English and de in Spanish followed by an NP. This realisation is especially frequent 
with indicio and sign, followed by indication and señal, while it is less common with 
evidencia and prueba. The next kind of realisation, appositive clauses, is less than half 




Evidencia Indicio Prueba Señal
Postmodifier with de + 
NP
53 4 32 4 13
Postmodifier with other 
prepositions
2 0 1 1 0
Postmodifying 
appositive clause
18 6 4 3 5
Postmodifying relative 
clause
2 0 2 0 0
Premodifier 1 0 0 0 1
Determiner 4 4 0 0 0
Subject 4 3 0 1 0
Direct Object 17 16 1 0 0
Subject Complement 0 0 0 0 0
Prepositional 
Complement
1 1 0 0 0
Before clause 11 6 2 3 0
After clause 3 2 0 1 0
Implicit in the context 4 1 2 0 1
Table 5. Realisations of the Belief with the Spanish EIPS
The realisations of the Belief in a clause preceding the one containing the shell noun 
occurred above all with evidence and proof in the English data, and with evidencia in 
the Spanish data. Occurrences of the Belief in a clause following the clause where the 
evidential noun occurred were only found in the Spanish data, and determiners were 
only found with evidencia (‘this/that evidence’ with the sense of ‘evidence of this/
that’). The cases of Direct Object are much more common in the Spanish data, due to 
the occurrences of the construction poner/dejar en evidencia (‘put/leave in evidence’) 
mentioned above. 
Tables 6 and 7 register the frequency of the different syntactic functions of the NPs 
headed by EIPS. The numbers lead to infer that the English EIPS, in contrast to the 
Spanish EIPS, commonly occurred with existential constructions, in the pattern ‘there + 
verb + (determiner and/or adjective) + evidential noun’. The number of Direct Objects 
in the English data more than doubles that of the Spanish data; proof is frequent in this 
pattern (as in I have concrete proof, the snow gave them proof, we have no proof, or 
examples (21) and (27) above), while no cases were found of its correlate prueba. On the 
other hand, Adjuncts are more frequent with the Spanish EIPS, due to the construction 
en señal de discussed above. The function of Subject Complement is quite common in 
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both languages, and some cases were also found of Object Complements. Prepositional 
Complements are much more common with Spanish EIPS, due to the construction 
poner/dejar en evidencia mentioned above. A few occurrences were also found in both 




Evidence Indication Proof Sign
Subject 17 6 6 3 2
Notional Subject 27 12 6 3 6
Direct Object 32 5 9 12 6
Adjunct 4 2 1 1 0
Subject Complement 28 2 6 8 12
Object Complemhent 3 0 0 0 3
Prepositional 
Complement
4 2 1 1 0
Postmodifier of another 
constituent
9 1 1 3 4
Apposition 7 0 2 2 3
Table 6. Syntactic functions of the NPs headed by the English EIPS
Total 
Spanish
Evidencia Indicio Prueba Señal
Subject 18 8 6 3 1
Notional Subject 1 0 1 0 0
Direct Object 14 5 9 0 0
Adjunct 13 4 3 0 6
Subject Complement 33 3 15 5 10
Object Complement 8 0 2 4 2
Prepositional 
Complement
21 20 1 0 0
Postmodifier of another 
constituent
4 2 1 1 0
Apposition 8 1 6 0 1
Table 7. Syntactic functions of the NPs headed by the Spanish EIPS
With regard to thematicity, Tables 8 and 9 specify the cases in which the NPs headed 
by EIPS are (part of) the PreHead, the Head or the Rheme of their clauses. The results 
indicate that the cases in which NPs are part of the Rheme heavily outweigh those 
in which they are PreHeads or Heads, so EIPS may be considered prone to having 
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communicative weight. Additionally, even when EIPS are PreHeads or Thematic Heads, 
the high frequency of postmodifiers confers informational weight to them, since the 
clausal constituent in which they occur is long. In sum, although a more in-depth analysis 
of the data would be required to confirm this statement, EIPS are not easily seen as 
transmitting only ‘Given’ information, i.e. information treated as known by or accessible 
to the addressee. EIPS do not seem to share a property that Schmid (2000, 308) attributes 
to shell nouns in general: “More often than not, the characterisation entailed in a given 
noun goes entirely unnoticed, since one tends to overlook that the choice of shell nouns 
is completely up to the speaker of an utterance.” Rather, EIPS seem to have a prominent 




Evidence Indication Proof Sign
PreHead 2 0 1 0 1
Thematic Head 16 6 6 3 1
Rheme 113 24 25 30 34
Table 8. English EIPS as (part of) the PreHead, Thematic Head or Rheme
Total 
Spanish
Evidencia Indicio Prueba Señal
PreHead 3 3 0 0 0
Thematic Head 17 6 5 5 1
Rheme 100 34 39 8 19
Table 9. English EIPS as (part of) the PreHead, Thematic Head or Rheme
8 Conclusions and suggestions for further research
This paper has explored the expression of evidentiality, understood as a functional-
conceptual domain characterised by the meaning of kind, source and/or evaluation for or 
against the truth of the proposition, with the English nouns evidence, indication, proof 
and sign and their Spanish equivalents evidencia, indicio, prueba and señal.  The eight 
nouns are shell nouns, and as such they have the discourse functions of encapsulating, 
labelling and signalling. More concretely, they belong to Schmid’s (2000) subtype of 
evidential nouns, characterised by an evidential frame consisting of an observed fact 
(the Sign), a mental state (the Belief) and a relation between both, namely that the 
observation of the Sign triggers the Belief. The nouns do not have evidential status per 
se; rather, they have evidential and non-evidential uses, depending on the linguistic 
context in which they occur. Evidential uses are characterised by the existence of the 
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Belief, non-occurrence of the nouns in the scope of an irrealis context, and constant 
value of the evidential qualification when the Belief refers to a plurality of events. If the 
uses meet these conditions, the evidential meaning is non-defeasible and may therefore 
be considered as part of semantics, not of pragmatics. However, these uses are to be 
considered as peripheral expressions within the domain of evidentiality, since they are 
always part of the content of a proposition and do not fulfil Anderson’s (1986) second 
and fourth criterion. However, they are definitely to be included in functional-conceptual 
accounts of evidentiality, since they are used by the speaker/writer to qualify the truth 
of a proposition by characterising and evaluating the evidence for or against this truth. 
The quantitative analysis of 400 occurrences of the nouns extracted from the BNC and 
the Peninsular Spanish part of the CREA has uncovered that all the nouns except prueba 
and señal occurred in evidential uses in more than half the cases, that the evidential 
qualification is often nuanced with other expressions (clues), and that there is great 
variation in the Sign and the Belief, in terms of both syntax and information structure: 
both can be realised by different kinds of constituents in the same clause as the evidential 
noun, or else they can be located in previous or following clauses. The tendency of 
the nouns to occur in clausal Rhemes suggests that they have a weighty labelling 
function, in the sense that the status of the Sign as evidence for the truth of the Belief is 
highlighted. The study has also uncovered idiosyncratic uses of some of the nouns, as 
in the constructions en señal de ‘as a sign of’ and poner/dejar en evidencia ‘put/leave in 
evidence’.
Similar research could be carried out on more evidential nouns (such as signal or 
symptom) and the number of languages could also be increased. Studies might also be 
carried out on other nouns that are not evidential themselves but are easily conceived 
as forming part of evidential strategies (for example, with the verbs show or suggest), 
such as nouns with a meaning of information aimed to be used as evidence (data, figure, 
statistics, etc.) and factual shell nouns of the ‘linguistic’ type (report, rumour, statement, 
etc.). The factors signalled here for distinguishing evidential and non-evidential uses of 
the nouns under study might also be tested for expressions of other syntactic types that 
also belong to the content of a proposition, such as adjectives. For example, the irrealis 
factor seems to block evidentiality in a number of adjectives such as apparent, as can be 
seen in (34):
(34) Consequently, great care has to be taken when interpreting marks seen on aerial 
photographs, and wherever possible the site should be visited on the ground to 
establish whether the marks have resulted from a buried archaeological site or 
from some other cause.
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 Whatever the method used to discover a new site, the most important element is 
to record its position and any other details that might be apparent at the time of 
discovery.
Therefore, research along the lines pointed out above would shed light on the scope of 
evidentiality, understood as a functional domain, when expressed by linguistic devices 
that belong to the content of a proposition.
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